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Abstract:   At the Madrid summit in December 1995, the EU heads of state or government
endorsed a three-phase plan for the introduction of the single currency. The purpose of the
paper is to identify how, besides an obvious fall in revenue from intra-European currencies
trading, a single currency will alter fundamentally and permanently European banking
markets. A common currency will likely change the sources of competitive advantage in
various markets such as those of government bonds and their fast growing appendices the
interest rate derivative markets, of corporate bonds and equities, of foreign exchange, and
of fund management. The benefits derived from the creation of a leading international
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The Maastricht Treaty on European Union provides for the introduction of a single currency
by January 1, 1999, at the latest. Although a large series of papers and conferences have
been concerned with the timing and sequencing of the introduction of the new currency and
with an estimate of the costs that would be incurred, very few published studies have
attempted to evaluate the likely impact of a single currency on European banks. The
purpose of the paper is to identify the various ways in which a single currency will alter
fundamentally and permanently the European banking markets. No attempt will be made
to analyse the short term significant changes brought by the introduction of the currency,
but the focus will be entirely on the medium and long term impact. One question is being
addressed : Once a single currency is in place, what is likely to change in European
one can rely on to draw conclusions ; secondly, banking
by major forces, such as deregulation, institutional savings,
globalization of corporate clients. One needs to take into
banking markets ? This is a complex question for two main reasons. Firstly, there is no
equivalent historical episode
markets are already affected
information technology and
account these forces of change to evaluate the specific impact of the single currency. To
address this issue, references to a wide economic literature will be made, ranging from the
theory of market microstructure to international monetary economics. Throughout the
analysis, no attempt will be made to identify those countries
currency. Therefore, the conclusions of the paper are mostly
participating countries.
likely to adopt the single
relevant for banks of the
besides an obvious fall in The analysis developed in the paper will attempt to show how,
revenue from intra-European currencies trading, a single European currency will change
fundamentally and permanently the sources of competitive advantage of financial
institutions. Indeed, an analysis of the structure of the banking industry raises the question
of the importance of a currency factor. For instance, the markets for pensions funds and
mutual funds management, or the Euro-Francs and Euro-Lira bond markets are quite2
fragmented with domestic institutions capturing a very large market share. Although this
fragmentation is explained in part by regulations and history, it could reflect the importance
of national currencies. Another example is the leading role of American institutions in the
dollar-denominated Eurobond market. Will the emergence of a new world currency
competing with the US dollar help the competitiveness of European banks ? The purpose
of the paper is to answer these questions by showing how the introduction of a common
currency is likely to change the sources of competitive advantage in various markets such
as those of government bonds and their fast growing appendices the interest rate derivative
markets, of corporate bonds and equities, of foreign exchange, and of fund management.
Seven impacts are identified ; they concern mostly wholesale and corporate banking. It is
the author’s view that the single currency per se will not change much the nature of retail
banking in the medium run, except for the very important fact that a single currency will
render irreversible the creation of a single banking market. A more predictable environment
will facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale and the optimal location of processing
units.
The paper is structured as follows. The first two sections review briefly the origin of
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the current discussion on the introduction of a single
currency. The third section summarizes the current forces driving the transformation of the
European banking industry, namely deregulation, institutional savings, information
technology, and globalization of corporate clients. The core of the paper is in Sections Four
to Seven. Section Four presents the impact of a single currency on European capital and
banking markets. The government bond markets, the corporate bond and equity markets,
the fund management industry, the Euro-deposit markets, the market for foreign exchange,
and the role of London as an international financial center will be successively analysed.
Section Five will assess the prospect for euro as an international currency and evaluate the
likely benefits for European banks. Section Six will evaluate the impact of a single currency
on credit risk and make an argument for an increased international diversification of loan
portfolios. Finally, Section Seven concludes the paper and summarizes the effects that a
common currency will have on European Banking.3
Section One : The Origin of EMU, a Reminder
Ten years ago in 1985, the European Commission published the  White Paper on the
Completion of the Internal Market which provides for the free circulation of persons, goods,
and capital in the European Union. In 1989, the Committee for the Study of Economic and
Monetary Union recommended in the  Delors Report  a three phase transition spread over
ten years. Its conclusions were incorporated in the February 1992 Maastricht Treaty on
European Union. Stage I ruining from July 1, 1990 to December 31, 1993 provides for
the freedom of capital flows and the coordination of national monetary policies. Stage II
started in July 1994 with the creation of the European Monetary Institute. One of its
missions is to prepare the monetary institutions and the European System of Central Banks.
Finally, Stage III will lead to European Monetary Unification (EMU). Article 109J of the
treaty is quite specific on the timing. At the latest in December 1996, the Council of Heads
of State or government with qualified majority decides if a majority of States qualify,
decides to start Phase III, and if it is the case fixes the starting date (at the latest January
1, 1999). If no decision has been taken by the end of 1997, the starting date will be January
1, 1999. Before July 30 1998, the Council will decide which countries will join EMU
].
The economic benefits and costs of EMU were discussed in a European Commission’s
study  One Market, One Money  (Emerson, 1990). The report cited four major benefits
arising from the introduction of a single currency : Reduction in transaction costs, reduction
in risk, increased competition, and emergence of an international currency competing with
the US dollar. The first benefit is the obvious reduction of transaction costs linked to a
reduced need of exchanging intra-European currencies. With intra-European trade
representing sixty percent of the international trade
estimated in the Emerson study at ECU 13.1-19
1The single European currency will replace
of the European Union, the savings was
billion
2, representing 0.3 to 0.4 % of
national currencies in those countries
meeting the macroeconomic convergence criteria. The United Kingdom and Denmark have
kept their option to join open.
2Although the single currency will be named the  euro,  we shall follow the current
practice of keeping the ECU as the unit of account throughout the paper.European Gross Domestic Product. This
expense of financial institutions providing
4
reduction of transaction costs is coming at the
the foreign exchange service ; it would represent
around five percent of banks’ value added
3. The second benefit attributed to EMU is a
reduction of foreign exchange risk and of substantial changes in relative prices. The
reduction of transaction costs and foreign exchange risk will presumably facilitate the
realization of the single market programme, allowing firms to choose the appropriate size
and optimal location, facilitating restructuring, investment and economic growth. The third
identified benefit is derived from the use of a single denomination measure which will make
price comparison easier, increasing competition and consumers’ welfare. Finally, the fourth
benefit of EMU is the creation of a world currency competing with the US dollar and the
assumed (but unidentified) benefits of an international currency status.
A potential cost of EMU was mentioned by several economists. It is the sacrifice of
national monetary autonomy and the possibility of adjusting exchange rates to restore
competitiveness. In his review of European Monetary Unification, B. Eichengreen (1993)
expressed doubts that the four benefits alone can outweigh the cost linked to the loss of
monetary autonomy. In his view, the major benefit of EMU can be argued if a single
currency is a necessary concomitant of the single market programme the benefits of which
are likely to be substantial. Resistance to the creation of the market would be reduced if the
single currency could prevent ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ type of competitive devaluations.
EMU is therefore the cement of the single market which by integrating previously
fragmented markets will allow firms to realize gains in productivity and competitivity.
For reference, Table One documents
4 the relative economic importance of the European
Union of fifteen countries (EU15) in the world. The EU15 population amounts in 1993 to
370 millions (VS 258 millions in the United States, and 125 millions in Japan), Gross
Domestic Product to ECU bn 5,798 (VS ECU bn 5,663 in the USA, and ECU bn 3,780 in
Japan), and the exports to non EU-countries to ECU bn 483 (VS total export of ECU bn 415
in the USA, and ECU bn 322 in Japan).
3Gross revenue before provisions and operating expenses.
4Tables are to be found at the end of each section.5
Table 1: Macroeconomic Statistics (end-of-1993)
Austria Belgium
 1 Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Population 8 10.3 5.2 5.08 57.7 81.2 10.4
(million)
GDP 162.2 180.8 115 74.8 1080 1453 60.24
(ECU bn)
Import 43.35 94.14 27.27 16.1 180.7 306 19.6
(ECU bn)
(from EU15) (30.04) (71.5) (17.7) (9.31) (111.3) (171.7) (12.35)
Export 35.85 105 33.2 20.96 185.6 339.4 8.5
(ECU bn)
(to EU15) (23.5) (79) (20.8) (11.9) (115.8) (199) (5.7)
Public Debt 63.63 227.3 13.7 26.78 365.8 414.2 76.88
(ECU bn)
ECU rate 14.6 40.29 7.59 6.42 6.57 1.936 278.2
Source : International Financial Statistics (IMF), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994 (IMF), Eurostat.
1 The Export and Import figures include the external trade of Luxembourg.7

























































Source : International Financial Statistics (IMF), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994 (IMF), Eurostat.
1 ECU per £Section Two : Issues with the Introduction of a Single Currency
8
Since early 1994, there has been a series of papers and conferences on the way to replace
national currencies by a European one and on the implementation costs
5. The practical
issues mentioned in those studies refer to changes in computer programmes, accounting and
payment systems (including ATM/POS, coins/notes), and the legal issues linked to the
status of all financial contracts denominated in national currencies with maturity
overlapping the date of introduction of the single currency. The total cost incurred by the
introduction of a single currency have been estimated by the Banking Federation of the
European Union (1995) at ECU 8-10 billion, the equivalent of two percent of banks’
operating expenses, repeated over three or four years. The estimate for single banks vary
widely with figures ranging from ECU 100-150 million for large banks
6 (AMUE, 1994)
to an estimate of ECU 6 million for a Belgian bank (Swings, 1994). These studies have
referred to the very practical problem caused by decimalisation, as the conversion from
national rounded prices into euro prices is unlikely to be equally rounded. As Levitt (1994)
puts it nicely : “Management of exchange rates is not normally undertaken to facilitate
mental arithmetic”. Not only the public will need to adapt to decimals, but, apparently,
computers as well. An expert from Euroclear is quoted saying : “It should not be taken for
granted that all bond-related securities system can accommodate decimal figures for
nominal amounts” (Dinne, 1995). Besides references to arbitrage opportunities
7
, these
5Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (1994), ECU Banking Association
(1994), Levitt (1994), Maas (1994), Banking Federation of the European Union (1995), and
European Commission (1995).
6This cost would increase by 50 % if, instead of a ‘big bang’ a dual currency involving
the ECU and national currency is put in place. Note the criticism of Mr Ruding of Citibank
who worries about the cost of having to run in parallel a dual currency system (1995).
7Financial analysts of the transition period have pointed out the potential arbitrage
opportunities between DM-bond and ECU-denominated bond priced currently with a spread
of 1 % over the DM interest rate. Indeed when EMU will take place, the frozen-weight
ECU basket will be replaced with the new currency on a one to one basis with an interest
rate likely lower than today’s ECU rate (Financial Timesa, 1995, Artus-Lenoir, 1995).9
studies on the practical aspects of the introduction of a single currency have referred to two
historical experiences : The United Kingdom and Germany. The Decimal Currency Board
in Great Britain planned the decimalisation over a six years period from 1966 to 1971
(Bishop, 1994 and Levitt, 1994). But, German Monetary Unification took place in a much
shorter period. From the proposal for monetary union in February 1990, via the treaty
signed in May 18, 1990, to the effective change of currency in the first week of July 1990,
it took five months (Schroder, 1994).
A large part of the most recent discussion has centered on the sequencing of events and
whether there would be a big bang in which all denomination, payment systems and means
of exchanges will be converted in  euro in a very short period, or whether there will be a
dual-currency process where euro and national currencies would co-exist. In May 1995, the
European Commission building on the results of the Maas Committee’s report published
a consultative Green Paper (European Commission, 1995, and Bishop, 1995) which sketches
the framework. It proposes a “mounting wave” approach with three phases spread over four
years. In November 1995, the European Monetary Institute presented a proposal for  The
Changeover to the Single Currency (EMI, 1995a). The plan was endorsed by the EU heads
of state or government at the Madrid summit held in December 1995.
Period 1 : The Launch of EMU. Early 1998, the decision to launch EMU is taken at a
qualified majority and the participating countries are nominated. The heads of state or
government will make their decision on the basis of the recommendation of the Council of
Ministers, taking due account of the reports submitted by the European Commission and
the EMI
8 (EMI, 1995b).
Period 2 : January 1, 1999. The exchange rates of the participating countries will be
irrevocably fixed. To create a significant volume of transactions in  euro,  the monetary
8According to the German Ratification Act on the Maastricht treaty, the vote of the
Federal Chancellor in the European Council is subject to the approval of the upper and
lower chambers of the German parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat) as regards the strict
examination of the convergence criteria. This was confirmed explicitly by the Federal
Constitutional Court (Deutsche Bank, 1995).10
policy including foreign exchange interventions with third countries currencies, bank
reserves management and open market polices will be run in euro. New government debt
would be issued in  euro.  And the wholesale interbank market for real value transfers
operating through TARGET will be run in euro. Phase B would last a maximum of three
years ending with Period 3 in 2002.  Conversion facilities  will translate amounts from
European into national monetary units and vice versa, at the irrevocably fixed conversion
rates. In principle, these facilities will be set up in financial institutions. However, for those
institutions which have not been able to equip themselves with the necessary conversion
facilities, the national central banks could provide such facilities.
Period 3: On January 1st, 2002 at the latest, European banknotes and coins are introduced,
and a dual currency system involving euro and national currencies will be run. Six months
later (1st July 1992 at the latest), national banknotes and coins lose their legal tender and
euro becomes the sole currency.
The launching date of EMU (January 1st, 1999) created its first impact on financial markets
in March 1996 when German investors concerned with uncertainty expressed a clear
preference for short maturity bonds, and when the London Financial Futures Exchange
(Liffe) perceived the need to clarify the status of short term interest rate contracts with a
delivery date for March 1999
9.
It appears clearly from the early work on the introduction of a single currency that there
is no technical impediment to the introduction in 1999, and that the costs are bearable.
Therefore, an assessment of the likely impact of a single currency on European banking is
a highly relevant and timely exercise.
Before evaluating the specific impact of the single currency on European banking markets,
we first summarize the current forces driving the transformation of the European banking
industry. This will allow to evaluate the specific impact of a single currency in the likely
restructuring of the banking industry.
9Financial Timesb,c 1996.11
Section Three : Current Forces Shaping the Transformation of the
European Banking Industry
As the move to a single currency will be in many ways an additional force driving the
transformation of European banking, it is useful to identify the existing forces : Worldwide
deregulation, demographic change with an institutionalization of savings, revolution in
information technology, and the globalization of corporate clients.
Deregulation
Over the last fifteen years, the European banking industry which used to be heavily
regulated has been freed. Deregulation has concerned abandon of credit controls, interest
rate setting agreements, and cross-border capital controls.
institutions such as savings banks have been enlarged, so
between different categories of financial services firms is
exchange business has been deregulated and the universal
The powers of many financial
that the institutional distinction
increasingly blurred. The stock
banking model has allowed the
creation of large diversified financial houses. Deregulation in Europe is partly driven by
‘free market’ forces, but also by the process chosen for European integration. Indeed, since
the 1992 single market programme had entailed a very minimal harmonization of existing
regulations
10, forces for competitive deregulation are at work, each country trying to
enhance the attractiveness of its home markets. For instance, money market funds were
progressively allowed in most European countries, and reserve requirements on bank
deposits have been reduced significantly. The impact of deregulation has been profound
because it has altered the form of competition observed in retail banking markets.
Competition through prices and product differentiation are progressively replacing branch
network competition. Moreover, the regulatory rents which were partly captured by labor
(Neven, 1993) disappear progressively under the competitive pressure. In various countries,
deregulation has led to rationalization of the branch network, partly through domestic
mergers. Table Two illustrates some of the major domestic mergers which have taken place
in Europe. This should not hide the flow of cross-border mergers, and in particular the
10Such as regulation on capital or large credit exposure.12
purchase of British merchant banks by commercial






widely preserved from bank failures since the Second World War, various leading
institutions have in recent years needed a public safety net in Finland, France, Norway,
Spain and Sweden.
Demographics and the Institutionalization of Savings
Table Three documents the rapid increase expected for the Elderly Dependency Ratio, that
is the ratio of retirees as a percentage of the working population. For instance, this ratio is
expected to increase in Italy from thirty percent
very rapid change expected in demographics
schemes, and substantial increase are expected
to forty five percent in the year 2020. The
has raised the need for funded pension
in institutionalized savings, pension funds
or life insurance policies. If cross-country comparison is a guide, one can expect a major
increase in this type of savings. Indeed, as Table Four documents, life pension assets
represent 107 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the Netherlands for only 12 percent in
Italy
12.
The anticipated change in demographics has two major implications. The first one is that
the financial resources raised traditionally by banks under the form of deposit will have to
be replaced by life insurance reserves and/or pension funds. The successful move by banks
into life insurance is a testimony of the need to access a growing market. The second
implication is that pension funds are sophisticated investors likely to invest domestically
and internationally in the capital (bond/equity) markets. One can therefore anticipate an
enormous growth in the size of capital markets in Europe
13. In a very competitive
environment in which performances of funds are evaluated almost daily through marking-to-
market rules, these institutional investors contribute to the pressures exercised on
11The Bank of England (1993) has identified 247 European cross-border alliances in
the financial world over the period 1987-1993. Morgan Grenfell, Barings, Warburg,
Kleinwort Benson, and Smith New Court have been recently purchased by respectively
Deutsche Bank, ING-Bank, Swiss Bank Corporation, Dresdner and Merrill Lynch.
12Cross-country comparisons are an imperfect guide to the future because tax
differentials can have an important effect on the relative size of pension funds.
13Expansion facilitated further by the privatization of large state-owned companies.13
management of firms, and banks
based management strategies.
in particular, to move away from market share to value-
Information Technology
Some fundamental and permanent functions of banks entail the bookkeeping, transfer of
wealth, and identification, measurement and management of risks, all functions dealing with
the storage, manipulation and transformation of informations. As a consequence, the rapid
progress in information technology is transforming the banking industry in several
dimensions : less paper-based work, new instruments (such as derivatives), access to new
international securities markets, new channels of distributions (home banking, direct
banking), and dematerialisation of securities which transform custodial business.
Technology has allowed the entry of new non-bank competitors such as ATT and IT
universal credit card or Reuters and Telerate in spot currency trading (Aronson, 1995).
Globalization of Corporate Clients
The creation of the single market in Europe, the realization of the North-American Free
Trade Agreement, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiation in 1994, and the rate of economic growth in South-East Asia contribute
massively to the globalization of the manufacturing business. This has put pressure on
banks to deliver services for these international clients in terms of trade financing or
international cash management. An indirect impact of globalization is that the treasury-
finance activities of international firms are increasingly centralized in a location that needs
to be accessed by financial institutions.
European banks have gone through significant restructuring in the last fifteen years. This
was led primarily by deregulation, but also by changes in savings, information technology,
and the globalization of large corporate clients. It is in this context that we attempt to
evaluate the impact of a single currency on the European banking industry.14
Table 2: Domestic Mergers in Europe
1
Belgium 1992 CGER-AG (Fortis)
1995 Fortis-SNCI
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1 Not complete. For illustration only.15
Table 3: Elderly Dependency Ratio
(Number of Persons Aged 65 & Over as Percentage of the People Aged 25-59)
1990 2020












United Kingdom 34 40
USA 27 36
Japan 24 55
Source : Poortvliet and Laine, 1994 (author’s calculation).16




















Section Four : European Money and Capital Markets with a
Currency
In view of the large increase in the size of capital markets fuelled by demographic
Single
changes
and institutional savings, the impact of the single currency on capital markets is first
evaluated. We shall analyse successively the government bond market, the corporate bond
and equity market, institutional fund management, the Euro-deposit and loan market, the
market for foreign exchange, and finally the role of London as a European financial center.
Table 5 documents the relative importance of capital markets in Europe. In 1993, the
capitalized stock market to GDP ratio stood at 44 % in Europe, compared to 73 % in the
United States and 79 % in Japan. Within Europe, this ratio varies greatly with on one side
the United Kingdom at 107 % and on the other side Austria at 16 %. Similar ratio for a
bond market dominated by public debt stands at 68 % in Europe, compared to 85 % in the
United States and 42 % in Japan. Within Europe, there is a wide difference with Denmark
at 180 % and the United Kingdom at 30 %.
The Government Bond Market
The first observation is that the arrival of a common currency will create the need for a
single risk free-interest rate yield curve matching interest rates to maturities to act as an
anchor for the pricing of securities. A unique characteristic of the single European market
is the absence of a federal debt the price of which could help to derive a yield curve. It will
be left to market forces to choose the national government bonds that will qualify as risk-
free bonds. Country ratings provided in Table 6 show that six out of the fifteen countries
have today a AAA status
14, with an additional two with a AAl status (Belgium,
Denmark). Together in 1993, these six AAA-countries represented 44 % of outstanding
European public debt. One will notice the particular place of the Al-rated Italy whose
public debt amounts to 32 % of total European debt.
14Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.18
A first and very likely rapid impact of the creation of a European risk-free
be the consolidation of the fast growing derivative industry. Indeed, as very
yield curve will
few instruments
are needed to ride a yield curve in a particular market, the single currency implies that there
will be a need for only a few euro- based interest rate instruments. Table 7 shows that the
number of interest rate future contracts traded in Europe in 1994 reached 223 millions,
fairly close to the 245 millions contracts traded in the USA. The European interest rate
derivative market is quite fragmented with Liffe having a market share of 39 %, compared
to 29 % for Matif, and 9 % for DTB. With few exceptions, the derivative instruments are
traded in a place close to the cash bond market. If the American case is a guide, there is
little doubt that the twenty European interest rate future contracts will be replaced by a few
(three or four)  euro-  rate contracts. Indeed, we do not observe in the United States the
creation of contracts competing with those already established. Moreover, since the
economics of clearing houses is based on netting of positions and pooling of counterparty
risks, it will be efficient to merge the different clearing houses into one to facilitate the
accounting, netting and clearing mechanisms.
A second observation about the government bond market in Europe is that, in many
countries, it is very much a fragmented market with domestic players capturing a large
market share. This raises the question of the sources of competitive advantage for local
banks. The economics of underwriting of securities and secondary trading typically refer




Long term historical access to customer
Credit risk evaluation
National currency denomination which facilitates the understanding of national monetary
policy, the placement power with access to investors, and the understanding of trade
(demand/supply) flow patterns.
As concerns the underwriting of government risk-free bonds, Feldman-Stephenson (1988),
a Federal Reserve study (1991), and Fox (1992) show that the dominance of local players
is the result of three main factors. The first is historical with local players having a
privileged access to the public debt ; the second is domestic currency denomination which19
facilitates the access to a large investor home base, providing a significant advantage not
only in placing, but also in





understanding the demand/supply order flows. Finally expertise
environment provide essential information to operate on the
Will these sources of competitive advantage survive with a
As domestic currency denomination, the main source of competitive advantage identified
for local banks in the literature, will disappear, it is quite likely that we shall observe the
emergence of a truly integrated European bond market. If access to information on the
supply/demand order flows seems essential for secondary trading, then very likely
operations at the European-wide level will become a necessity. As a tentative base for
comparison, it is symptomatic to observe from Table 8 that the top ten American
underwriters of municipal debt control 64 % of the market.
The Corporate Bond and Equity Markets
As is the case for government bonds, a key issue concerns the sources of competitive
advantage of local institutions in corporate bond and equity underwriting and secondary
trading. As explained earlier, customer relationship, assessment of credit risk, and currency
of denomination are critical sources of competitive advantage
16. The Eurobond market
presents an interesting case. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1991)
reports a strong correlation for non-dollar issues between the nationality of investors and
the lead bank manager. This is confirmed by Tables 9 to 12 which show that with very few
exception the lead managers in the Eurobond markets in France, Italy, Spain or the United
Kingdom were invariably local institutions. The domestic currency denomination facilitating
the access to an home-investor base was a key-source of competitive advantage for
15The other factor, credit risk evaluation, is less applicable in the case of European
government bonds.
16A fourth factor, financial sophistication, can also be mentioned. An example from
France is the successful role of Bankers Trust in the privatization of Rhone Poulenc with
the design of synthetic options to protect the value of employees’ shares.20
placement but also for secondary trading. Moreover, an understanding of local monetary
policy would give a competitive advantage to understand price movements. On the dollar-
denominated issue, the Federal Reserve study reports a strong correlation between the
nationality of the issuer and that of the book runner. This is explained by the relative
importance of customer relationship and a better assessment of credit risk which seems to
dominate the currency and home-investor factors in the case of a well accepted currency.
From the overall Eurobond league documented in Table 13, it is symptomatic to observe
that no British institutions are in the top ten. Quite illustrative, Warburg left in 1995 the
Eurobond market which it helped to create when Sir Siegmund did a fifteen million dollar
loan to the Italian road builder Autostrade in July 1963. The leading role of American
firms is explained not only by large issues by American companies, by their expertise
developed in their home corporate securities markets, but also by the important advantage
linked to the dollar denomination of many bonds. Indeed, an understanding of US order
flows and US monetary policy provides a decisive advantage in secondary trading as it
helps to predict price movements.
A single currency in Europe will change fundamentally the competitive structure of the
corporate bond and equity markets as one key-source of competitive advantage, namely
home currency, will disappear
17. Indeed, savers will diversify their portfolio across
European markets, the exchange rate risk being eradicated. Moreover, a single currency will
suppress the secondary trading advantage for domestic banks derived from a better
understanding of order flows and monetary policy in the domestic country. Therefore, the
two main sources of comparative advantage remaining for local players will be historical
customer relationship and the understanding of credit risk through a better knowledge of
the accounting, legal, fiscal (not to mention language) environment. In our view, whenever
the credit risk embedded in corporate securities can be assessed better by domestic banks,
it is likely that these players will control underwriting and secondary trading. However,
another factor could alter the corporate underwriting business. If manufacturing firms
consolidate across Europe and centralize their finance department in the country of the
17This will be even more the case if effective Chinese walls between departments
prevent the use of the home-based clientele to place underwritten issues.21
parent, the portfolio of domestic client firms would have to be reviewed.
As concerns competition in the corporate bond and equity market in third non-EU countries,
an expansion of the role of euro as an international currency
18 will reinforce the position
of European banks. That is because very much as is the case today for American firms with
dollar-denominated bonds, European banks will enjoy a competitive advantage in the euro-
denominated securities market.
Finally, as the activities of underwriting of securities and secondary trading have been
identified as quite complementary (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1994), one has to see whether the
trading of domestic securities could migrate to a European exchange located in another
country, de facto modifying the competitive advantage of domestic players.
As concerns the competition between securities exchanges, several authors
19 refer to the
network externality of a stock market. A market like any communication network is subject
to network externalities. The demand for immediacy (liquidity) is more readily satisfied the
more traders in the market because the probability of executing an order increases with the
number of traders. As a result, a market has a natural monopoly that benefits from being
the first mover. One often refers to London as the candidate for a European securities
market given its current size or turnover in foreign equities. The Bank of England
20
reports that 587 overseas securities are already quoted on SEAQ International, and that in
1992 more than twenty percent of the overall turnover in those shares took place on
SEAQI. The movement to a single currency would facilitate securities exchange in one
market
21. However, centralization into one market is likely to be defeated by new
information technologies that will allow to bypass floor-based trading. With an information
technology that disseminates rapidly information and the fact that European exchanges are
moving to some form of screen-based trading, the location of an exchange will matter less
18The role of euro as an international currency is analysed in Section Five.
19 Such as Stoll (1990), Amihud-Mendelson (1991), Scott-Quinn (1992), or Hawawini-
Skill (1992).
20Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, March 1993.
21But a recent study by de Jong, Nijman and Roell (1995) fails to identify significant
lower spreads on SEAQ International for small trades.22
and less for secondary trading. These authors anticipate a web of interlinked exchanges with
efficient transmission of information and centralized clearing and settlement systems
22. The
important implication in the context of this study is that secondary trading can be initiated
from any place by the banks developing an expertise in domestic securities. To conclude
this analysis of the impact of a single currency on the corporate bond and equity markets,
it seems that customer relationship and an understanding of credit risk will remain two
sources of strength for domestic firms.
Fund Management
An important segment of capital markets business is the fund management industry,
pensions funds or mutual funds. League Tables 14 and 15 for the United Kingdom and the
United States report a fragmented structure of the pension fund industry controlled mostly
by domestic firms. Evidence on the importance of economies of scale in the industry is not
definitive as one observes the fairly small market share achieved by the five largest fund
managers in the United States (13.2 %), while the top five in the United Kingdom control
53.3 % of the market. Another large segment of the industry is the mutual fund industry.
Table 16 documents the structure of the European market. One will notice the relative
importance of money market funds in some countries such as France (68 % of the market),
while equity funds dominate in others countries such as the United Kingdom (93 % of
market). Country data for France, the United Kingdom and the United States provided in
Tables 17-19 confirm the existence of fragmented markets entirely controlled by local
players. In view of this extreme fragmentation, specially in comparison with other segments
of the capital markets, one is wondering about the impact of the single currency on the fund
management industry. In this case too, an understanding of the main sources of competitive
advantage needs to be developed. They concern the retail distribution network, the home-
currency preference, and the existence of economies of scale.
The first source of competitive advantage in the retail segment is the control of the
distribution network in the hand of local banks (Kay, Laslett, Duffy, 1994). Domestic
22 For a discussion of the problem of clearance and settlements systems in Europe, see
Giddy, Saunders and Walter, 1995.23
control of distribution is even protected under current European legislation framework
which gives to national authorities the right to regulate the marketing of funds into one’s
territory. Obviously the advantage derived from the control of the distribution network
applies to retail investors only, as it will not be a barrier of entry in the institutional market.
A second source of competitive advantage was the customer preference for home-currency
assets, often imposed by regulation. A single currency will of course eliminate this factor
and reinforce the need for European-wide portfolios
23. A large part of these will be
provided by index-tracking investment funds. The existence and relevance of economies of
scale for mutual funds is still a debated issue. One of the very few study on the subject
demonstrate in the case of France the absence of economies of scale for funds larger than
ECU 450 Millions (Dermine-Röller, 1993). A third source of success is excellence in
research-based management. It would seem that domestic expertise in the assessment of risk
will still be a source of competitive advantage for local institutions supplying specialized
funds.
A single currency will eliminate the obstacle to international diversification. One will
observe very likely low cost European index-tracking funds competing with smaller
research-based funds. On the retail distribution side, domestic banks will keep their
competitive advantage as long as the branch network remains a significant channel of
distribution.
The Euro-Deposit, Cross-Border Payments, and Euro-Loan Markets
An extremely efficient Euro-deposit market was created thirty years ago to circumvent
various forms of domestic regulations
24. Table 20 documents the success of some countries
such as Luxembourg and the United Kingdom in attracting the deposits of foreign non-bank
investors. The size and location of the Euro-market is directly related to the relative size
of the Net Regulatory Burden imposed by national rules (Levich, 1993). An important issue
yet to be clarified by the European Monetary Institute concerns the size, the coverage and
23Kay et al. (1994), or Jorion (1994).
24Aliber (1976) or Dufey-Giddy (1994).24
the eventual remuneration of the reserve requirement in the future. Indeed, foreign deposits
are not subject currently to reserve requirements in most countries. More important, but
unrelated to the single currency, will be the fiscal treatment of the income earned on these
assets in the future (Dermine, 1995).
Another dimension of Euro-banking is the cross-border payment system and the current role
of correspondent banks. The current situation is that international payments are done through
the accounts of banks in foreign countries and through the various national clearing
systems. The European Monetary Institute (1995c) has provided some indications on the
future European payment system. In essence, it favors a decentralized national-based system
complemented by TARGET
25, a linkage between the various national real-time gross
settlement systems. Only the payments related to monetary policy will have to pass through
TARGET. Other payments will have the choice between the direct route or the traditional
correspondent banking system. If the role of correspondent banking is likely to be altered,
it seems that this movement would happen independently of the existence of a single
currency for the sole reason of reducing settlement and payment risks.
Finally, as concerns the Euro-loan market, empirical evidence documented in Table 21
confirms the conclusions of the Federal Reserve study (1991) according to which currency
denomination is not a key factor in Euro-lending, but that there is a strong correlation
between the nationality of the borrower and that of the lead manager. As is the case for
corporate bond and equity underwriting, customer relationship and domestic expertise in the
assessment of credit risk in Euro-lending remain key sources of competitive advantage for
national banks.
25TARGET : Acronym for Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer system.25
Foreign Exchange Markets
A first observation is that not only intra-European foreign exchange transactions will
disappear, but that the competitive advantage of a particular bank in its home currency vis-
à-vis third country currencies will go as well. As an example, a Belgian bank operating in
New York will not be anymore the Belgian franc specialist, but will compete with other
European banks on the euro business. As is the case for the government bond markets for
which an understanding of the supply/demand order flows is important to assess the
direction of price movements, we are likely to observe a consolidation of the commodity -
type low cost spot foreign exchange business. Differentiated products based on quality of
service or innovations such as options will be another source of competitive advantage.
Corporate Advisory Service such as M&A
Another dimension of capital markets is the market for advisory services, in particular
those related to Merger & Acquisition. Table 22 reports the league table for deals involving
cross- border acquisition of European targets.
this business, but that customer relationship
competitive advantage explaining the success
It seems that currency is not a key factor in
and financial expertise are key sources of
of Anglo-Saxon institutions.
The City of London
Based on the City Research Project (Brealey-Soria, 1993), Table 23 documents the market
shares achieved by London in various segments of international capital markets. A question
arises as to whether the move to a single currency will enhance further the role of London
as a financial center. A subsequent question is whether the
the euro would slow the process.
As we have argued, there will be very strong forces in
commodity-type activities into one market, such as trading
co-existence of the pound and
favor of consolidation of the
of government bonds, interest
rate derivatives, and spot currencies. Given its current level of expertise and the
international acceptance of the English language, London is a prime candidate to house the
government bond, interest rate derivative and currency markets. As concerns the corporate26
and equity markets, we have argued that individual countries would keep an activity in
those securities for which national banks keep a competitive advantage in the assessment
of risks. For similar reason, specialized fund management firms
additional factor, independent of the currency, which explains the
center will be the quality and cost of local regulations.
As concerns the effect of a possible non-participation of the Pound
can remain local. An
success of a financial
in EMU, it seems that
the conclusions reached above would not be altered significantly as long as the political
consensus for free financial markets remain strong in the United Kingdom.
The conclusion that emerges from the above analysis of European capital markets is that
there will be quite significant changes in some specific segments of the industry. We
forecast a rapid consolidation of the commodity-type business, government bonds, interest
rate derivatives, and spot currency trading. We believe that domestic expertise in the
accounting, legal and fiscal environment gives a competitive advantage to domestic players
in the corporate bond and equity markets. On the fund management side, European-wide
index-tracking funds will compete with specialized funds. Finally, the rules of monetary and
fiscal policies still have to be known to assess the impact of a single currency on the size
and location of the Euro-deposit markets.27
Table 5: Capital Markets 1993
Stock Market Bonds Markets
Capitalization ECU bn
ECU bn
(Percentage of GDP) (Percentage of GDP)
Austria 25.7 (16 %) 76 (47 %)
Belgium 70 (38.7) 252 (140)
Denmark 47 (41) 207 (180)
Finland 27 (36) 29 (39)
France 392 (36) 577 (53)
Germany 387 (27) 1,287 (89)
Greece 11 (18) 32.9 (168)
Ireland 14.3 (35) 18 (44)
Italy 173 (21) 730 (88)
Luxembourg 9 (107) 2.75 (33)
Netherlands 227 (86) 173 (65)
Portugal 11.3 (20) 24 (42)
Spain 125 (30) 147 (35)
Sweden 97 (63) 157 (101)
United Kingdom 962 (107) 273 (30)
EU15 2,578 (44) 3,916 (68)
United States 4,107 (73) 4,813 (85)
Japan 3,001 (79) 1,594 (42)
Switzerland 245 (107) 176 (51)
Source : Euromoney, World Financial Handbook September 1994.28

























Source : Moody’s France, January 199529
Table 7: Interest Rate Futures
Instrument Exchange 1994 volume (000’s)
Nº of Contracts Traded
Belgian Bond Belfox 688
90-day Bibor Belfox 150
German Bund DTB 14,160
German Bobl DTB 5,647
German Bund Liffe 37,335
German Bobl Liffe 73
Danish Medium Bond Futop 103
Danish Long Bond Futop 417
Long Gilt Liffe 19,048
3-Month Sterling Liffe 16,603
Euro-Swiss Liffe 1,699
Italian Bond Liffe 11,824
Eurolira Liffe 236
10 Ys Italian MIF 3,702
5 Ys Italian MIF 667
10 Ys French Matif 50,153
Pibor Matif 13,176
ECU Bond Matif 618
10 Ys Pesetta Meff RF 13,191
MIBOR Meff RF 3,730
Eurodollar Liffe 1,020
Total EU 223,552
Total USA CBOT+CME 245,393
Total Japan TIFFE 50,424
Source : Futures and Option World, February 199530


































Source Securities Data Co.31
Table 9: French Francs Gross Euro-Issues
Top 10 Lead Managers, 1993





















Source : The Capital Markets Yearbook, Euromoney, March 94
Table 10: Italian Lira Gross Euro-Issue






















Source : The Capital Markets Yearbook, Euromoney, March 9432
Table 11 : Spanish Peseta Euro-Issue








Bank of Tokyo 0.1
HSBC 0.1
Source : The Capital Markets Yearbook, Euromoney, March 94
Table 12 : Sterling Gross Euro-Issue












Source : The Capital Markets Yearbook, Euromoney, March 9433

































Source Euromoney Bondware, Financial Times January 11, 9534


































































The Economist, November 199335
Table 16: The European Mutual Funds Industry (1993)
Country Assets Relative Share of Relative Share of
(ECU bn) Equity Funds Money Market
Funds
Austria 13.3 3.5 %                                             -
Belgium 9 21.2 % 18.2
Denmark 3.2 59.1                                   -
France 291 8.2 68
Germany 60 17.5                                                              -
Greece 1 48 38.4
Ireland 4.7 31 5.3
Italy 34.4 22 23.7
Luxembourg 151 4 30.1
Netherlands 28.8 39.7 9.8
Portugal 6.6 3.5 29.5
Spain 49.2 0.5 53.3
Sweden 15.3 69.5                                -
Switzerland 18 -
United Kingdom                83 93.2 0.7
Total 769
Source : Gestion Collective, sept/oct 199336

































Source : Gestion Collective, Sept/oct 1993.



































































The Economist, November 199338
Table 20: External Position of Banks in Individual Reporting Countries























































Source : BIS, International Banking and Financial Developments, February 199539
Table 21 : Arrangers of International Loans, 1994
ECU bn
Chemical Bank 14.2









Source : Euromoney Loanware, Financial Times Dec. 28, 1994.40





































Source : Financial Times May 4, 1995 (from IFR Securities Data).41




























































Source : Brealey and Soria (1993)
Notes.
1. Equity turnover figures have been halved since the exchange reports both purchases and sales.
2. Calculated as the proportion of global cross-exchange trading (transactions in an exchange foreign
to the nationality of the security).
3. Calculated as the proportion of the total number of contracts transacted worldwide.
4. Calculated as the proportion of trading in futures on 6 major indices.
5. Proportion of worldwide turnover in interest rate and currency options transacted worldwide.
7. Percentage of world turnover in commodity futures and options.
8.1992 share of worldwide net forex turnover in BIS survey.
9. Total notional principal of swaps and related products.
10. Estimated proportion of worldwide activity.
11. Proportion of international or euro issues.
12. Share of secondary trading in eurobond.
13. Amount of loans outstanding.
14. Share of foreign and domestic currency loans to non-residents plus foreign currency loans to
residents.42
Section Five : Euro as an International
One of the asserted benefits
challenger to the US dollar as the
accounts, store of value and means
of EMU is
Currency
that the single currency will become a
dominant international currency used for units of
of payments (Emerson, 1990 ; Alogoskoufis-Portes,
1991 and 1992 ; European Commission, 1995). But, one has to realize that contrary to a
national currency which is imposed as sole tender by national legislation, the role of an
international currency is fixed by demand and supply on world capital markets. Our
objective in this section is twofold. Firstly, we document the relative importance of the US
dollar as an international currency and evaluate the chance of the euro to compete with the
dollar. Secondly, we assess the benefits of the international currency status of  euro  for
European banks.
As is the case for any domestic currency, the role of an international currency is threefold.
It serves as :
￿ A unit of account for measuring and comparing market values.
Ž A store of value in which assets or liabilities are denominated.
Ž A mean of exchange for the settlement of financial contracts,
Unit of Account
Besides the fact that several commodities such as gold or oil are denominated in US dollar,
one notices the central role of the dollar in the currency market. Tables 24 and 25 document
the volume of spot transactions involving the dollar in London or in the currency option
market in Paris. For instance, more than seventy percent of spot trading in London involves
the dollar. This is of course the result of an efficient market which by directing demand and
supply to a few (dollar-related) contracts create maximum liquidity in the market. With only
(N-1) independent currencies, this is the traditional problem
N(N-1)/2 pairs of cross rates by only ((N-1) independent
of replacing a constellation of
exchange rates. If the single43
currency will of course eliminate intra-EU currencies trading, it is doubtful that the pivotal
role of the dollar in the foreign exchange market would disappear.
Store of Value
Whether one look at the 60 % share of dollar-denominated assets in foreign exchange
reserves (Table 26), the 36 % share of dollar-denominated international bonds (Table 27)
or the 52 % share of cross-border bank claims (Table 28), one draws the conclusion that
the relative importance of the American currency vastly exceeds the relative share of the
United States in world exports (12 %) or world GNP (27 %). But if the international role
of the dollar is very strong, one can notice a continuous erosion of the dollar position. For
instance, the share of the dollar in foreign exchange reserves has fallen from 84.5 percent
in 1973 to 60 percent in 1992, while the share of the DM has raised from 6.7 percent to
16.6 percent.
Mean of Exchange
The share of the dollar as a mean of exchange in international trade has been documented
by Emerson (1990). Table 29 indicates that
dollar, while imports from the United States
Whether one look at the role of the dollar as
of payment, it still is today by far the prime
to compete and at what speed ?
17 % of Belgian imports are denominated in
amounts to 5.3 % of total Belgian imports.
a unit of account, a store of value, or a mean
international currency, Will the euro be able
To assess the chance of the  euro  to accelerate the relative decline in the dollar, it is
instructive to have a look at history and the relative fall of sterling and rise of the dollar
in the international payment system.
In 1914 on the eve of the First World War, the City of London was indisputably the
world’s leading international financial center, with the sterling pound the major international
currency. According to economic historians
26, the weakness of the pound started with the
26Dehem (1972), Kindleberger (1984), McKinnon (1993), or Roberts (1994).44
first world war. The war of 1914-1918 saw the emergence of large bond financing in the
USA. This was coupled with the events of 1931 -the insolvency of the Creditanstalt in
Vienna and the inconvertibility of the pound. The development of the second world war
succeeded in increasing even more the stature of the dollar which was confirmed in its
international role by the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement
27. One can conclude that the rapid
rise of the dollar over a thirty years period was very much helped by the two world wars,
and that despite the abandon of convertibility into gold in 1971 and continuous devaluation,
the dollar is still maintaining twenty five years later a leading role as an international
currency
28. Based on the recent two decades which have seen a progressive erosion of the
dollar and a slow rise of the Deutsche Mark, in view of the relative economic size of
Europe, and building on the potential for growth in the eastern part of Europe, one can
extrapolate and forecast that  euro will replace the D-Mark and be a strong competitor to
the dollar. But in the author’s opinion, any forecast on the relative importance of the US
dollar and the euro in the future is premature and beyond our understanding. Indeed, for
a financial contract involving a non- euro country (say a Chilean company borrowing on
international market from a Malaysian investor), the choice of currency denomination will
be related partly to liquidity (achieved by the dollar and the euro), but also by an efficient
risk sharing that takes into account the risk and return characteristics of a particular
currency. The continuous devaluation of the dollar is clearly not enough to decrease the
international role of that currency. Indeed, interest rates can simply adjust to cover the
expected rate of devaluation. In any case, based on the financial history of the last eighty
years, it is likely that the creation of an international currency competing with the dollar
will, unless unforeseen events, take many years to be realized.
27According to McKinnon (1993), a key factor increasing the role of the dollar was the
European payment Union established in september 1950 for clearing payments
multilaterally, using the US dollar as the unit of account and as the mean of payment.
28It is interesting to compare the pre-1914 period to the current world. While in pre-
1914, the Pound was the international vehicle and the strong currency, London being the
financial market place, we observe today an unbundling of these functions, with on one
hand the weak dollar still as a reserve currency, the D-Mark and the Yen as the strong
currencies, and London and New York as the international financial centers.45
What are the implications for banks of having  euro as an international currency ? Three
benefits can be identified. The first one is that an increased volume of euro- denominated
assets or liabilities will ease the foreign exchange risk management of equity. Indeed, a
large part of bank assets will be denominated in the same currency as the equity base,
easing the control of asset growth and capital management. Secondly, access to a central
bank discount window will make the liquidity management of  euro-  based liabilities
potentially easier. Finally, if third countries issue assets denominated in  euro or use the
European currency as a vehicle, European banks will be well positioned in secondary
trading for the reasons mentioned earlier.46
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Source : BIS Annual Report 1994, Alogoskoufis-Portes (1992)49
Table 27 : International Bonds Outstanding
Currency 1986 (%) Dec 1994 (%)
Austrian Schilling 0.09 0.28
Belgian Franc 0.1 0.1
Luxembourg Franc 0.35 1.4
Danish Krone 0.24 0.1
Deutsche Mark 10 10.8
Dutch Guilder 2 2.4
ECU 3.4 4.2
Finnish Markka 0.08
French Francs 1 6.1
Italian Lira 0.15 2
Portuguese Escudo 0.1
Sterling Pound 3.9 7.6
Spanish peseta 0.5
Swedish Krona 0.2
Swiss Francs 15 7.5
Japanese Yen 9.7 15.8
US Dollar 51 36
Total Outstanding (ECU bn) 693.3 1841
Source : BIS International Banking and Financial Markets Development, 1995.50
Table 28: Currency Composition of Banks’ Cross Border Claims.
(Foreign Currencies to All Sectors)
1986 (%) 1994 (%)







us $ 63 52
Total Outstanding 1,675 3,490
Ecu bn
Source : BIS International Banking and Financial Markets Development, 1995.51
Table 29: Invoicing of Trade in Belgium
Imports BEF DM EU15 $
Currencies
1993 28 % 22 % 77.9 % 17.2 %
1985 28 % 18.5 % 71.7 % 23.4 %
Exports BEF DM EU15 $
Currencies
1993 30.3 % 18.9 % 80.7 % 15.9 %
1985 35 % 18 % 82.7 13.9 %
Source : Bulletin de la Banque Nationale de Belgique (1995), OECD Monthly Statistics
of Foreign Trade (1995).
For reference, the shares of Belgian imports from Germany, EU15 and the USA are
respectively 22 %, 76 %, and 5.3 %. The shares of Belgian exports to Germany, EU15
and the USA are respectively 21 %, 75 %, and 4.8 %.52
Section Six : EMU and Loan Credit Risk
Many of the channels which have been identified concerned the money and capital markets.
Last but not least in this evaluation of the impacts of the single currency is the potential
impact on loan credit risk. There are reasons to believe that the nature of credit risk could
change under a single currency. The argument is based on the theory of optimum currency
areas and on the objective of price stability inscribed in the Treaty on European Union.
There is an old debate on the economic rationale leading a group of countries to adopt a
common currency (the theory of the Optimum Currency Areas
29). This debate has been
revived by the proposal to introduce a single currency in Europe (Emerson 1990, von
Hagen-Neuman, 1994, and Eichengreen, 1994). The story is the following. The more
countries are subject to asymmetric economic shocks, the more they would appreciate
monetary autonomy to cancel the shock. Indeed, with symmetric shock there would be a
consensus among the members of a currency union on economic policy, but with
asymmetric shocks the policy run from the center may not be adequate to all the members
of the union
30. The loss of monetary autonomy is often regarded as the major cost of
European Monetary Union. Recent economic developments have strengthened the argument.
The 1994 Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements shows that the 1993
exports of the countries whose currencies depreciated (Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) were able
conditions in Europe and take advantage of rapidly
America and South-East Asia. Their export volumes
exports from the group of stable currencies (Germany,
29Mundell (1961), McKinnnon (1963).
to overcome very sluggish demand
expanding export markets in North
combined rose by 7.5 % while the
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
30This theory assumes essentially rigid prices and a relatively immobile workforce.
Tentative empirical work by von Hagen and Neumann (1994) suggests that Austria,
Benelux, France, and Germany do form an homogeneous zone, but that Denmark, Italy and
the United Kingdom are subject to asymmetric economic shocks.53
the Netherlands and Switzerland) stagnated. How could the introduction of a single currency
affect credit risk ? If a bank concentrates its business in its home country, and if that
country is subject to asymmetric shocks, it is quite possible that monetary policy will not
be able to soften the shock. For instance, one can wonder whether the rapid recovery
enjoyed by British banks in 1994 has not been helped partly by the devaluation which has
reduced somewhat a bad debt problem. An indirect and interesting corollary of the
Optimum Currency Area theory is that for banks operating in a single currency area, the
need to diversify their loan portfolio increases the more their home country is likely to be
subject to asymmetric (uncorrelated) shocks. This can be achieved through international
diversification or the use of credit derivatives.
A second effect of EMU is that the statute of the European Central Bank could prevent
laxist and inflationary policies. Ceteris paribus, this could increase the potential for losses
resulting from default, as one cannot count anymore on a predictable positive drift for the
value of collateral assets 
31, although an argument can be made that non-inflationary policies
would reduce the amplitude of business cycles.
31For sake of completion, one can point out that an independent central bank policy
committed to fight inflation will produce lower nominal interest rates, reducing the
traditional margins earned on retail deposits.54
Section Seven : Conclusions
The objective of the paper has been to identify the various ways through which a single
currency would alter the sources of competitive advantage of European banks. Our analysis
has identified various markets which will be significantly affected. Besides the obvious fall
in revenue from intra-European currencies trading, the analysis has led to seven main
conclusions.
1. The structure of national government bond markets and their fast expanding appendices,
the interest rate derivative markets, will change fundamentally. The fragmented national
markets will be replaced by a European consolidated market. This is due to the fact that
two main sources of competitive advantage for domestic banks which have been identified
in the literature, namely access to home-base investors and expertise in national monetary
policy, will vanish. Moreover, many of the national interest rate derivative instruments
which have been created in recent years will disappear, being replaced by a few euro- based
instruments.
2. An analysis of the
fundamental changes.
competitive advantage
corporate bond and equity markets leads to significant but less
In these currently fragmented markets, three main sources of
are client relationship, assessment of credit risk, and currency
denomination which may facilitate placing to home-investors and secondary trading through
a better understanding of the macro-monetary policy. With a single currency, the benefits
derived from a national currency will disappear. The two remaining sources of competitive
advantage for domestic players
credit risk of domestic firms. The
the issuer and the nationality of
sources of competitive advantage
will be historical client relationship and assessment of
currently observed correlation between the nationality of
the underwriter will remain strong whenever these two
are at work. But the portfolio of domestic clients could
be altered if global firms decide to move their financial department to another country.55
3. The fast growing, currently fragmented,  institutional fund management industry will
change permanently. Index-tracking funds will operate at the European level, competing
with funds build on research-based expertise in specific industries or countries.
4. The Euro-deposit and the cross-border payment system will be affected by the
introduction of a single currency. As the location of the Euro-deposit market is affected by
the relative size of the net regulatory and fiscal burden, one is waiting to know the tools
of European monetary policy, and in particular the level and coverage of the reserve
requirement, as well as the fiscal rules that will apply. As concerns cross-border payments
and the role of correspondent banking, the European Monetary Institute has advanced plans
for a European-wide cross-border payment system, but it seems to the author that this
development is unrelated to the single currency and would have happened in any case to
accelerate settlement and payment.
5. The role of euro as an international currency has often been mentioned as a major benefit
of a European Monetary Union. Based on history of the last thirty years with the growing
share of the D-mark, one can anticipate that the creation of an euro managed by an
independent European central bank will accelerate the competition to the US Dollar. But,
as economic history shows, this process is likely to take many years. An international role
for the euro will facilitate the underwriting and secondary trading of bonds and equities
issued in third countries.
6. Currency trading between the euro and other currencies will be altered fundamentally.
Indeed, very much as is the case with government bonds, the arrival of a common currency
will erase the source of national comparative advantage. Very likely, there will be a
consolidation of foreign exchange activities to benefit from scale economies.
7. The last impact of a single currency considered in this paper concerns  credit risk. The
creation of a single currency will change the nature of domestic credit risk, as domestic
recessions might not be softened by flexible national monetary policies. This should
encourage further the diversification of credit risk through international lending or credit56
swaps.
The seven impacts which have been identified concern mostly wholesale and corporate
banking. It is the author’s view that the single currency per se will not change much the
nature of retail banking in the medium run, except for the very important fact that a single
currency will make irreversible the creation of a single banking market. A more predictable
environment will facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale and the optimal
of processing units. This conclusion applies to retail banking as long as the branch
remains a significant channel of distribution.
location
network
The objective of the 1992 single market programme was to reinforce the efficiency and
competitiveness of European firms. As concerns banking, it is a clear conclusion that the
introduction of a single currency will not only make the creation of a single market
irreversible, but that it will, besides the obvious fall in revenue from intra-European
currencies trading, alter fundamentally the nature of several businesses. This will be
particularly the case in the money and capital markets. If this challenge is met successfully
by European banks, there is little doubt that it will reinforce the competitiveness of
European banks operating in the capital markets of third countries such as those of the
United States, and of the rapidly expanding Asia.57
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